What the case law actually shows

Written and reviewed by Connor SteensJohn Evans
Updated
offshore trusts
Flag of the Cook Islands
Asia PacificCook Islands
Common failure 1
Retained control
Settlor as co-trustee or protector
Common failure 2
Timing
Settled after the claim arose
Statutory failure
None reported
Not one case hinged on the Act breaking down
Exposure that remains
Contempt
Against the settlor personally

Why the cases matter

The case law on Cook Islands trusts rewards close reading because it offers what promotional material never can: a record of how the structure holds up when a well-resourced party armed with legal authority sets out to defeat it. The headline is three decades of reported attacks without a single successful statutory challenge, yet the way each dispute actually played out teaches you far more than that summary line.

One thread ties every reported loss together: wherever a settlor came out badly, the case involved retained control, poor timing, or both at once. Not a single one hinged on the Cook Islands statute failing to work as written. That is the point that genuinely counts, and it repays going through the cases one by one to see it plainly rather than trusting a summary that skips the facts that mattered.

FTC v Affordable Media — the Anderson matter

This is the Ninth Circuit ruling people quote most as evidence that Cook Islands trusts fail. Read properly, it shows the reverse.

In 1995, long ahead of any FTC action, Michael and Denyse Anderson set up a Cook Islands trust. Some years afterward a telemarketing business hired them — a business the FTC later determined was fraudulent. The FTC brought suit and secured a repatriation order. AsiaCiti, the Cook Islands trustee, declared an event of duress, stripped the Andersons of their co-trustee positions, and declined both to send back the assets and to account for them. In other words, the anti-duress clause did precisely what it was written to do.

The Andersons were found in civil contempt. Alongside the licensed trustee company they had made themselves co-trustees, and trust protectors as well. Once the duress clause fired and their co-trustee roles were removed, their protector powers remained intact. The Ninth Circuit concluded that those surviving protector powers left them a practical path to comply, so their impossibility defence collapsed.

Here is the detail nearly every published account leaves out: the assets never left the Cook Islands. The trust was upheld by the Cook Islands High Court, which ordered the FTC to pay costs. In the end the FTC settled with the Cook Islands trustee on confidential terms. Because those terms were never disclosed, the widespread claim that the FTC got the assets back finds no support anywhere in the public record.

Two lessons emerge from the case. First, the statute did its job. Second, acting as both your own co-trustee and your own protector is the surest structural mistake you can make.

Lawrence v Goldberg

This Eleventh Circuit decision generated the harshest personal result among the reported cases — nearly six years of imprisonment for civil contempt.

Stephan Lawrence put money into a Cook Islands trust while arbitration was ongoing and an unfavourable award looked likely. Once that award arrived and bankruptcy set in, a repatriation order followed. Lawrence declined to comply and pleaded impossibility, and the Eleventh Circuit sustained his imprisonment.

The result came down to two things. Timing sank him: putting money in while an adverse award loomed is about the worst possible moment, and the negative inference from that timing was on the table before the court weighed anything else. On top of that, Lawrence held onto the ability to name a fresh trustee who could then undo his excluded-person status, so compliance stayed within reach along a two-step path. The court traced that path and ruled the impossibility was of his own making.

Anderson showed the structure holding on the asset-protection front even as the settlors were held in contempt; Lawrence is different, offering no clear proof that the assets stayed protected over the long run. The case is chiefly a lesson in what results when poor timing and retained control come together. Among the reported decisions it is the sharpest demonstration of why settling ahead of a foreseeable claim is not just the better option but a structurally different one.

Solow and In re Allen

Each one reinforces the timing lesson without introducing any new doctrine.

Solow concerned a transfer carried out after judgment. Transfers made post-judgment draw the greatest judicial hostility and give almost no protection under any asset-protection structure anywhere. This is not Cook Islands law breaking down; it is proof that you cannot plan asset protection working backward from a judgment already entered.

In re Allen concerned a well-drafted trust that carried anti-duress provisions. Allen was found in contempt on two occasions, and the Third Circuit upheld both rulings. Echoing Anderson and Lawrence, the court held the impossibility to be self-created. The decision adds further weight to the conclusion that self-created impossibility offers no defence, no matter how well-crafted the trust instrument may be.

The pattern

The reported cases and the real reason each one failed
CaseCourtWhat actually failedAssets returned?
FTC v Affordable Media9th CircuitSettlors held co-trustee and protector roles. Protector powers survived even after removal as co-trusteesNo. The trust was upheld by the Cook Islands court
Lawrence v Goldberg11th CircuitFunded while arbitration was under way. Kept the power to name a new trusteeUnclear. The result was imprisonment for contempt
SolowTransfer carried out after judgment. The worst timing there isN/A
In re Allen3rd CircuitImpossibility found self-created twiceN/A

Every reported result traces back to one of two failure modes. The first is retained control, where the settlor held onto enough authority for a court to conclude the impossibility was self-created. The second is bad timing, where the transfer took place after a claim had already emerged or was reasonably foreseeable.

In none of these cases did a court conclude that the Cook Islands statute had failed to work as designed. In none was a Cook Islands trustee directly forced to act by a foreign court order. What the courts consistently found instead was that the settlor could be reached personally, by a court that already held jurisdiction over them, and that the reason they could be reached was something the settlor had done — not any flaw in the statute.

What this tells you about drafting and timing

Four practical takeaways flow straight from the case record.

Settle early, before anything becomes foreseeable. Not before a claim is filed — before it is reasonably anticipated. Lawrence funded ahead of the award landing and was still nowhere near early enough, since the arbitration was already under way. Anderson got the timing right, which is exactly why the structure kept the assets safe even though the settlors ended up facing contempt.

Never act as your own trustee or protector. That structural mistake explains the result in Anderson and stays the surest way to undo an otherwise solid structure. The protector position calls for a genuinely independent appointee.

Do not hold onto powers that let a court say you could fix it. Part of why Lawrence lost was that he could appoint a trustee capable of restoring his access. Every power you reserve is one more link in a chain the court can follow.

Allow the trustee to act independently as time goes on. A trustee whose track record shows real exercise of discretion — including the occasional call that goes against what the settlor wanted — carries far more credibility at the contempt stage than one who has rubber-stamped every request.

The usual ways these cases get misread

The secondary writing on Cook Islands trust litigation keeps making the same mistake: it treats outcomes for settlors as though they were outcomes for the statute, when those are two separate things. Yes, Anderson yielded contempt findings. Anderson also yielded a Cook Islands High Court ruling upholding the trust, no recovery of assets by the FTC, and a confidential settlement that the FTC paid to the trustee. Which of these counts as the outcome depends entirely on the question you are asking.

Lawrence suffers the same misreading. Lawrence produced the longest reported civil contempt imprisonment tied to an offshore trust. It also produced no reported successful Cook Islands court challenge to the trust itself, for the simple reason that no such challenge was ever brought and won. The statute did not fail. A settlor who made two specific formation errors and one disastrous timing error paid a heavy personal price.

Reading these cases with care means keeping the question of what became of the trust apart from the question of what became of the settlors. On the trust question, the statute has behaved consistently. On the settlor question, particular implementation errors led to particular personal consequences. It is that distinction that decides whether the case law counts for the structure or against it.

What three decades without a successful statutory challenge actually means

When practitioners point to the Cook Islands' track record, two separate things are being pointed to. First, in no reported case has a Cook Islands court set aside a properly registered international trust under the section 13B provisions. Second, no US court has forced a Cook Islands trustee to repatriate. Both statements have been put to the test again and again and both still hold.

What the track record does not mean is that no settlor has ever borne personal consequences. Some have. The personal exposure that stays in place once a foreign court holds personal jurisdiction over the settlor is real, and the cases prove it. The structure answers the asset question. It does not, and has never professed to, answer the personal-jurisdiction question.

The three-decade record is best read as evidence that the statutory mechanism works as designed when it is implemented properly. It is not evidence that anyone using the structure is shielded from personal pressure. That has always been a separate question with a separate answer, and blurring the two leaves you misunderstanding both what the structure delivers and where its limits lie.

The questions to ask of any case summary you review

Whenever a published account of Cook Islands trust litigation lands on a verdict about whether the structure works or fails, put three questions to it. Was the settlement completed before the relevant cause of action arose? Did the settlor hold any trustee or protector role? Did the settlor keep any power that, via a chain of acts, handed them access to the assets?

A yes to any one of those means the adverse result reflects a structural error, not a failure of the statute. Only if all three answers are no, and the result was still adverse, would you have genuinely significant evidence against the statute. Across thirty years of reported cases, no such result has surfaced in the public record.

General information, not legal advice. Case summaries are inevitably condensed. Consult the individual case pages for fuller detail and read the full decisions with qualified US counsel before relying on any of them. See also the limitation periods and contempt and repatriation.

Speak to a specialistWorried about how your structure comes across?The two failure modes are retained control and timing. Our team will give you an honest read on how your position stacks up against both.Book a consultation Cook Islands Trust formation from $10,000, first-year trustee costs included.
Speak to a specialistWorried about how your structure comes across?The two failure modes are retained control and timing. Our team will give you an honest read on how your position stacks up against both.Book a consultation Cook Islands Trust formation from $10,000, first-year trustee costs included.
(Review & sourcing)
Written by
Connor Steens
BBus, business development
Reviewed by
John Evans
20+ years, offshore structuring
Last updated
17 August 2026
General information
Sourced from
Reported decisions
US federal appellate courts
01International Trusts Act 1984, as amended — consolidated text that incorporates the 1989 amendments.
02Cook Islands Finance factsheet, International Trusts Act s.13B — covering limitation periods and burden of proof.
03US Courts opinions via GovInfo — reported federal appellate decisions.

The most cited case is still FTC v Affordable Media, which the Ninth Circuit decided in 1999. What it means is widely misread. The statutory mechanism did its job and the assets remained in the Cook Islands. The contempt finding stemmed from the protector powers the settlors had kept, not from any failure of the statute.

No. The assets remained in the Cook Islands. The trust was upheld by the Cook Islands High Court, which ordered the FTC to pay costs. The FTC then settled with the Cook Islands trustee on confidential terms, and those terms were never disclosed. The claim so often repeated in secondary sources that the FTC recovered the assets has no support anywhere in the public record.

That the Andersons could not plead impossibility, because they had held onto protector powers after their removal as co-trustees. Those retained powers left them a practical path to comply. The court did not rule that Cook Islands trusts are ineffective, that anti-duress clauses are invalid, or that the Cook Islands trustee could be compelled. It ruled that these particular settlors kept enough control to be held personally in contempt.

Two facts came together. Lawrence funded the trust while an arbitration was actively running against him, which produced the adverse inference about his intent. On top of that, he kept the power to appoint a new trustee who could restore his excluded-person status, handing the court a chain of possible acts that led to compliance. The Eleventh Circuit traced that chain and concluded the impossibility was self-created.

That it is the decisive variable. Anderson funded in 1995, well ahead of any FTC involvement, and the assets stayed protected. Lawrence funded during active arbitration, producing the worst possible inference about intent. Solow transferred after judgment, which is essentially indefensible. Across all the reported cases the pattern is that timing accounts for outcomes more than any other single factor.

Not through Cook Islands litigation in any reported case. The statute has not failed on its own terms. Creditors have won contempt findings against settlors back in their home jurisdictions and now and then recovered assets by way of that personal pressure. But the Cook Islands mechanism itself — the limitation periods, the standard of proof, and the non-recognition of foreign judgments — has never been successfully overcome by a creditor in Rarotonga.

That every adverse result for a properly settled Cook Islands trust traces to structural errors by settlors, not to statutory failures. The recurring mistakes are acting as co-trustee or protector, keeping powers that make compliance possible through a chain of acts, and funding once a dispute is already foreseeable. None of those results needed the statute to fail.

The reported cases reflect how the statute currently in force operates. Since 1984 the Cook Islands legislature has amended the Act on several occasions, with each amendment generally reinforcing the protection rather than eroding it. The courts applying the statute have not handed down rulings that undercut its core provisions. Nothing is guaranteed, but across thirty years the track record points consistently in a single direction.

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